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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY G. HARLINE, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
RONALD C. BARKER and LARRY ] 
WHYTE, ] 
Defendants/Appellees. ] 
i Case No. 92133-CA 
I Category No. 16 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff/Appellant claims jurisdiction pursuant to 
Article VIII, Section 3, Constitution of Utah; Utah Code Annotated 
78-2-2 (3) (j) and (4); 78-2a-3 (2) (Effective January 1, 1992; and 
Rules 3 (a) and 4 (a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in that 
this appeal is from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
A Notice of Appeal was timely filed. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Plaintiff/Appellant brought this action against his 
former attorneys for malpractice arising out of their alleged 
actions while his attorneys representing him in a pending 
bankruptcy proceeding still pending in the United States Bankruptcy 
(1) 
Court of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court err in granting Defendants/ 
Appellees a summary judgment of no cause of action, pursuant to 
a motion filed by them against the Plaintiff? 
2. Did the Trial Court err in entering a bench ruling, 
not reduced to a formal order, that denied Plaintiff/Appellant's 
motion to compel the Defendants/Appellees to reveal who their 
witness would be in the event of a trial and answering other 
interrogatories propounded by the Plaintiff/Appellant? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Larson v. Overland 
Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 (Utah App. 1991) 
On review of a summary judgment the appellate court 
must examine all the facts presented and the inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the loosing party. 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 178 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1992); 
English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1989); Mountain 
States Tele & Tel. Co v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1991); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
(2) 
The appellate court should affirm a judgment based 
upon a summary judgment motion only where it appears there are 
no genuine dispute of any material facts. Reeves vs Geigy 
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1988); Hunt v. EEI 
Engineering, Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (Utah App. 1991). 
The appellate court accords no deference to a trial 
court's legal conclusions. Shurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 
814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). Frontier Foundations, Inc., vs. Layton 
Construction Co., 171 Utah Adv Rep 25 (Utah App. 1991) 
Issue No. 2: 
The appellate court should construe the Rules of Civil 
Procedure liberally. State ex rel Road Commission v. Petty 17 Utah 
2d 382, 412 P.2d 914 (1966). 
The appellate court should construe the Rules of Civil 
Procedure to simplify and make more efficient, pre-trial discovery 
and eliminate "trial by ambush". El lis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 
429 P.2d 39 (1967). 
RULES, STATUTES AND LAWS WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE 
OF THE ISSUES SET OUT FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(Set forth in the Addendum) 
Issue No. 2: 
Rule 26(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(Set forth in the Addendum) 
(3) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff/Appellant 
against the two Defendants/Appellees for alleged legal malpractice 
of the two defendants who are practicing attorneys at law. 
Defendants/Appellees filed a motion for Summary Judgment 
and filed their memorandums of authorities with exhibits in support 
thereof, which was responded to by the plaintiff who likewise filed 
exhibits and affidavits and reply memorandums. 
Plaintiff also filed a motion under Rule 37, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure to overrule certain objections filed by the 
defendants to the answering of certain interrogatories, and for 
an order to compel the defendants to answer the interrogatories. 
The Court, in a bench ruling, not reduced to a formal 
order, denied plaintiff's motion in its entirety. 
The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendants/Appellees and against the Plaintiff/Appellant stating 
that "there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the 
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
The present appeal followed in a timely manner and the 
Supreme Court referred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals 
as is provided by statute and rules. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. All depositions of the Plaintiff, (Dr. Harline 
(4) 
hereafter) and Defendants, (Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte hereafter) 
were before the Court and pertenant parts thereof were set forth in 
the memorandums filed with the court as were various exhibits, 
bankruptcy court transcripts and documents. References are made to 
the various documents hereafter by citing page number of the 
Record, but references are made to the Exhibits by letter number of 
the original document due to questions of the pagination numbering 
of some of the record. 
2. Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte are both duly licensed 
attorneys at law, who practice law in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
R. 2, Complaint; R. 13, Answer. 
3. Dr. Harline filed a voluntary petition in 
Bankruptcy under Chapter 11, 11 USC 1, et.sea., on February 14, 
1986, which was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding in 
September, 1988, and his discharge was denied. 
R. 242, Exhibits "A" and "L". 
4. The Bankruptcy Court entered its Order directing 
Dr. Harline and his attorneys to amend his bankruptcy schedules at 
the time that it converted the proceedings to a Chapter 7 
proceedings. 
R. 242, Exhibit "LM, Entry No. 74; R. 75 
Affidavit, Cotro-Manes, Exhibit "C", R-6, Complaint, Attached 
Court Order. 
(5) 
5. Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte did not amend any of Dr. 
Harline's bankruptcy schedules. R. 242, Exhibit "L". 
6. Dr. Harline, had been represented by Mr. Pete 
Vlahos, Esq., of Ogden, Utah, and then Mrs. Betty Marsh, Esq., of 
Ogden as his attorneys prior to his retaining Mr. Barker and Mr. 
Whyte. R. 242, Exhibits "C", "D" and "E". 
7. Dr. Harline has a pending malpractice suit 
which he filed against his first attorney Mr. Pete Vlahos, which 
action was moved from the Second Judicial District Court to the 
Third Judicial District Court. 
8. Mr. Barker denied that he was retained to 
represent Dr. Harline in his bankruptcy matter, Bankruptcy No. 86-
00623-JHA, but was retained solely to represent him in certain 
Adversary Actions filed in the bankruptcy case against 
Dr. Harline. R. 356 (Depo., Whyte p. 17). 
9. Dr. Harline claimed in his verified complaint, 
deposition and affidavit in opposition to the Motion for summary 
judgment that Mr. Barker did in fact represent him in his 
bankruptcy proceeding. R. 2, verified complaint; R. 162, p. 2, 
(Depo., Harline), also p. 119 thereof; R. 356, (Affidavit of 
Harline, par 3). 
10. Mr. Barker throughout his entire deposition 
denied that he was ever retained to represent Dr. Harline in his 
(6) 
b a n k r u p t c y ma t- t: ei o i t a 11 ed and i el iiiierl 1.i q i ' (•"> . I di r ec t and 
unequivocal answer: 
Mr Barker testified: 
flQ. (Mr. Cotro-Manes at line 1 6 ) : Were you retained 
to go into the various aspects of the personal 
bankruptcy of Dr. harline? 
1 ! I don' t believe so. ^. ^^u,
 v D e p o, Barker, p. 128) 
] ] I: Ir . Barker represented to the United States 
Bankruptcy Court that he was representing Dr. Harline in his 
Bankruptcy matter by his personal appearance before the United 
States Bankruptcy Court on November 28, 1986, The official 
transcript of the Court hearing on November 26, 198 6 before the 
h, - ' o h n H S 1 I e n , I J n i t e d S t a t e s B a n k r u p t c} • " o 
depos., of Barker and Whyte) in the matter of the withdrawal of M s . 
Marsh as attorney cf record for Dr.Harline in his bankruptcy 
m,atter, states c -. c«<.• 3 : 
"The Court: Are there other appearances? 
Mr. Barker: Ronald Barker." 
R . 358, (E x 1; I) • i;: > M a r s h , E x I , d e p o " s 
of Barker, W h y t e ) . 
M it: s M a r s 1 l i i i e x p 1 a i n i n g t h e r e a s o i i s f c :i : her 
motion t-; withdraw, which had been filed on November 14, 1986, 
stated to the Cour t: 
(/; 
(line 17, p. 3) "I'm asking the Court to allow 
me to withdraw. Mr. Barker, who is present 
here today, has already received the files 
that were given to him, I believe by the 
Vlahos & Sharp firm and he is already involved 
in proceeding forward. 
The Court then ruled from the bench: 
"The COURT: Well, I think that counsel has stated, 
counsel, old counsel--I don't want to say old counsel, 
then former counsel. 
Mrs. Marsh: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Has stated proper grounds to withdraw and 
new counsel has come in and I think it is appropriate. 
I'm not going to put any limitations on the withdrawal 
because of those reasons. I's sure Mr. Barker will 
cooperate in moving things along and I'll require an 
order authorizing withdrawal and then at this point I 
assume Mr. Barker will file his appearance." 
R. 358, (Ex., L to Def's Supp., 
Memo., pp. 3 and 5). 
13. Mrs. Marsh testified: 
Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes) And in reading over the 
transcript of the court appearance, (Exhibit 4) 
apparently Mr. Barker had a few things to say. 
Do you recall him actually saying those to the 
Court? 
A. Yes, I do. 
she previously testified: 
Q. Did he--did anyone register any objection to 
his appearance? 
A. Oh no. 
R. 359, (Depo., Marsh, p. 20). 
(8) 
I !r . Baikei repiesenled I. o I lie United States 
Bankruptcy Court by a sworn and verified petition for attorney's 
fees that he commenced to represent Dr. Harline in his bankruptcy 
matter < :>i : November 10, 1881. Ilk ,!«VJ ( hx , II, Depo's. , Barker and 
Whyte, R. 61 (Affidavit, Cotro-Manes, Ex. " A " ) . 
15. No other attorney made an,;,' sufaseqtiPi!1; appearance 
for Dr. Harline other than Mr.Barker, Mr. Whyte (Ex. No. 
35, Depo., Whyte) , R. 242, Ex. "I ,". and Mr. Cotro-Manes, the 
present attorney oi " " ^ >:\ who cii i make hi s appearance 
until July IP ?opc ; ;., : "L" p Docket No. 176. 
16. M" Barker, his sworn deposition to the 
contra • • :• : . :: : \ . * e under oat! :i :i n !: lis affidavit 
that he commenced to represent Dr. Harline in his bankruptcy 
i . December 31, 1991. R, 242, Affidavit of Barker in support of 
Motion f i Cdirintra,,y !,idgme*.t, L A . * , wherein on page 3, 
paragraph 6 Mt Barker, again under oath stated: 
"My First appearance on behalf of Harline in 
general bankruptcy proceedings was on about 
December 31, 1986." 
Mr. Barker was paid by Dr. Harline for 
general bankruptcy matters for work done by Mr. Barker from 
Nov en tbei 1 0 ] 98 6 through November 31 , 1986. R 61 Ex., No."A", 
Affidavit of Cotro-Manes), R 163, Affidavit, Harline, par 6 
and billings and cancelled check appended thereto. 
Whyte, while an employee of Mr. Barker in his 
deposition testified that he did not represent Dr. Harline in his 
personal bankruptcy. R. 360. 
19. Mrs. Betty Marsh, testified that Mr. Barker 
had been contacted to represent Dr. Harline as early as late 
October, or early November, 1986. R. 357 (Depo., Marsh, pp. 13, 
14, 19). 
At page 13 of her deposition Mrs. Marsh stated that 
in late October, mid to late October, she was acting as attorney 
for Dr. Harline. 
On page 14 she stated that she had possibly 
had two brief conversations with Mr. Barker. 
She testified: 
"A. (Mrs. Marsh) I think that I had one brief telephone 
call—again, I am not positive of this--I think I had 
one brief telephone call with Mr. Barker, long distance, 
he was in Salt Lake city, and I think we discussed this 
rather briefly, but it was somewhere between when Dr. 
Harline and/or Jerry Wight had advised me that he would 
be present at the hearing and then of course the day of 
this hearing we talked about--I don't remember exactly--
he was there for the hearing because of the fact that 
he was replacing both me and the Vlahos Firm." 
R. 357 (Depo., Marsh, p. 14), see 
also R 242, Ex "A", p 14. 
20. Dr. Harline testified that he believes his 
contacts with Mr. Barker was as early as late October or early 
November, 1986. R. 162, Affidavit, Harline, p. 1; R. 242, Exhibit 
"B"; Depo., Harline p. 4 & 5). 
(10) 
21 Mr. Larry Whyte was the employee of Mr. Barker and 
under the supervision of Mi. Barker. R. 359-360 (Depo., Whyte, p. 
13). 
22, Defendants both testified that they did not have 
nc • seen Dt , Ha t 1 i n* f :•» Bditki up* K $ Schedules, H:. Barker, 
the employer of Mr. Whyte, not at all ami Kr. Whyte as late as 
summer oi faU of 1987. 
Hi Hri k i testified: 
"Q, (Mr. Cotro-Manes): 1 believe you testified you 
had not seen the bankruptcy schedules in thi s matter? 
A. (Mr. Barker) that's my best recollection." 
R. 3 61 
z o . nr. Ba r k e r t es t i f i ed t ha t I: ie had i ic t seen 
Dr. Harline's Bankruptcy statement of affairs prior to the 
commencement of this suit nor had he requested any of his employees 
tc obtain copies. 
Mi: Barker testified: 
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes): I show you what has been 
marked for the purposes of this deposition as 
plaintiff's Exhibit 17, which appears to be. . . 
statement of affairs for debtor not engaged in 
business on the second page.... It is your testimony 
that you've never seen these documents before. 
A. (Mr. Barker) As near as I can recall, I've not 
seen them prior to this litigation. 
Q. Did you ever request Mr. Whyte for or on 
your behalf to obtain copies of the bankruptcy 
(11) 
schedules of Dr. Harline? 
A. Not that I recall 
R. 362 (Depo., Barker, p. 104). 
Mr. Whyte testified: 
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes) I show you what has been marked 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 17, which appears to be the 
various documents which respect to the statement of 
affairs, bankruptcy filings, schedules and whatever, 
and ask you if you can tell me within a time frame, 
like fall, winter, spring, whenever it was that you 
first saw this document. 
A. I'd say summer or fall of 1987." 
R. 362 (Depo., Whyte, p. 31). 
24. Defendants both testified that they had not looked 
at the docket sheet on Dr. Harline's Bankruptcy, Mr. Barker the 
employer of Mr. Whyte, not at all and Mr. Whyte not until the 
summer of 1988. 
Mr. Barker testified in his deposition: 
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes in referring to Exhibit 19): 
Have you ever seen this docket sheet before 
or copies of it or the original on file with the 
clerk's office? 
A. (Mr. Barker): Don't believe so. 
Q. Did you ever ask anyone from your office to obtain 
a copy of the docket of the matters filed in the 
Harline Bankruptcy? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Q. Did you specifically ever ask Mr. Larry Whyte 
to ever obtain a copy of it? 
(12) 
A, Nof *>*»*- T reca, . 
R. 362 (Depo,, Barker,
 F. +.*'<) 
1 11 . Wh y t H t e 5i 1.1 f i eri : 
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes) Did you ever see the docket sheet 
on Dr. Harline's bankruptcy? 
A, I donf t know 
Mr. Kayi 'ever1 as in this litigation or excluding 
this litigation? 
Mr. Cotro-Manes: At any time. 
Q. (bj Mr. Cotro-Manes) At any time? 
A. I don't specifically recall having seen the docket 
sheet prior this litigation I just don't recall seeing 
it." 
fn*?* whyte, p. 138, 139) 
25 Defendants both testified that they had not seen the 
order of Court directing the filing of amp"idp'i schedules. R. 242, 
Ex. "0", p. 2 (Barker Affidavit) ; b U 'i d>piji( Barker, 57); 
(Whyte Affidavit). 
2 6. r -l T e m e n t s f o :i M :i : B a r k e r t :> : :>i i ie i i :i a.s 
attorney for Dr. Harline were originally arranged for through the 
law firm representing Dr. Harline1s professional corporation and 
who had previ resent ed h i s persona 1 bai iki: upt cy . 
27 Mr, Barker, admits that he became attorney of record 
for Dr. Harline, at least in some capacity, by December 31, 1986, 
R . 3 '• 7 
(13) 
28. Mr. Barker never discussed with prior counsel, 
Mrs. Marsh matters pertaining to the bankruptcy proceeding. He 
testified: 
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes) I believe you've already 
testified you had no conferences with Mrs. Marsh 
relative to Dr. Harline's bankruptcy or bankruptcy 
matters? 
A. (Mr. Barker) At the bankruptcy court. That's the 
only thing I can recall." 
Q. Did you ever request of Mrs. Marsh to send you any 
documents or records or papers with respect to Dr. 
Harline or Dr. Harline's Bankruptcy matters. 
A. I don't recall doing so." 
R. 363 (Depo., Barker, p. 135) 
29. Mr. Barker did not request or obtain any copies of 
any 2004 examinations of Dr. Harline, nor did he make inquiry of 
Dr. Harline that such examinations had been taken. R. 364 (Depo., 
Mr. Barker, pp. 139-140) 
Mr. Whyte testified: 
"Q. Do you recall ever requesting or obtaining copies 
of any other 2004 examination of Dr. Harline? 
A. You said requesting or obtaining? 
Q. Yes. I can break it down into two questions if 
you want. 
A. No. I don't recall ever requesting, and I don't 
know if I've ever obtained or seen or had a copy of 
another 2004 Examination." 
R. 364 (Depo., Whyte, p. 48) 
(14) 
30. Mr. Whyte knew of a 2004 examination of Dr. Harline 
which took place in September, 1986, but made no effort to obtain 
a copy of the transcript or to ascertain what had been brought out 
in the examination. R. 364 (Depo., Whyte. pp. 48 and 49). 
31. Dr. Harline paid fees, both to Mr. Barker and to Mr. 
Whyte, in amounts of $24,0000 and $112,000 respectively. 
R. 372. 
32. Dr. Harline served interrogatories upon the defendants, 
to which, in part, defendants asserted objections, which ran to the 
disclosure of witnesses who they may or would call at the time of 
trial, on the grounds that the interrogatory sought information 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and attorney work 
product doctrine. They objected to describe or identify exhibits on 
the same grounds. They further objected to revealing whether they 
ever prepared amendments to Dr. Harline's bankruptcy, reviewed his 
schedules or statement of affairs; the number of bankruptcy 
proceedings each had represented clients in or the names of clients 
they represented clients in bankruptcy matters on the grounds of 
relevancy. 
R. 213 through 226, (Motion to Compel, Ex. 
"A") . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Where there are genuine issues of fact unresolved 
(15) 
the granting of a summary judgment is error. As the relationship 
between Dr. Harline and Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte, the extent of 
that relationship, the date that such a relationship occurred and 
what the conduct of the defendants was and whether damages resulted 
therefrom remains in question, the trial court erred in granting 
the defendants a summary judgment. 
2. Pre-trial discovery should not be by ambush or by 
trickery and it is error of a trial court to deny a party the 
ability to conduct meaningful pre-trial discovery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT CAN ONLY BE GRANTED 
WHERE THERE ARE NO MATERIAL FACTS 
IN CONTROVERSY 
The question of whether there was an attorney-client 
relationship, and when that relationship arose, was a material 
fact that remains unresolved in this matter. 
Plaintiff claims that there was such a relationship. 
Defendants deny this relationship. 
This is a crucial and material fact 'that would preclude any summary 
judgment. If this is the only contested material fact, it is 
sufficient to deny a summary judgment, as only one contested fact 
is necessary to deny a summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 
542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). 
(16) 
The question of the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship is a question of fact for determination by the 
trier of fact after a trial is held on the merits of the case. 
George v. Caton, 93 N.M. 370, 600 P.2d 822 (1979), and no formal 
contract is necessary to create a relationship of attorney and 
client, George, supra (citing cases from nine other jurisdictions, 
p. 827 of the Pacific citation). 
In George, a Navaho family allegedly contracted with 
a law firm to represent them in a wrongful death action. The 
action was not timely filed. The attorney's (two) testified that 
no attorney-client relationship had ever existed. A motion for 
summary judgment was granted the attorneys based upon their 
testimony. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment and 
held that it was a question of fact as to whether or not an 
attorney-client relationship was created. This is exactly the same 
situation that the case at bar poses. Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte say 
that no relationship, as to the bankruptcy, ever arose. Dr. 
Harline says to the contrary. 
Whether the relationship'of attorney-client exists 
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Grievance 
Com., Wyo, State Bar v. Riner, 765 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1988); Carlson v. 
Langdon, 751 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1988). Attorney-Client relationships 
may be implied. Margulies by Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 
(17) 
(Utah 1985); citing E.F. Hutton, 305 F. Supp. 387; Alexander v. 
Russo, 571 P. 2d 350 (Kansas App. 1977) No fee need be paid, Smith 
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 440 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1968); 
Alexander, supra.; Matter of the Discretionary Proceeding Against 
Gary G. McGlothen, 99 Wash. 2d 515, 663 P.2d 1330 (1983), 
although under the facts of this case, fees of over $112,000 were 
paid to Whyte and over $24,000.00 were paid to Barker. 
In the present matter, the record shows that defendants 
clearly, by their sworn statements, undertook to represent Dr. 
Harline in his bankruptcy matter. However, in spite of these sworn 
statements, they deny such an undertaking. This is a contested 
question of fact, which alone is sufficient to reverse the trial 
court's granting of a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 
However, there were more than one contested fact, they, the 
attorneys, claimed that even if there was an attorney-client 
relationship, still, the attorneys were not retained to file 
amended statements or schedules or to do anything with respect to 
the bankruptcy; further, they failed to look to the bankruptcy 
schedules to ascertain their adequacy and completeness. Also, they 
failed to speak with his former attorney, Betty Marsh to ascertain 
the current status of the bankruptcy matter. 
They failed to look at the court files to ascertain any 
outstanding order or the status of the pending bankruptcy. 
(18) 
They failed to move for an extension of time to file 
such amendments in conformity with the Order of Court. 
They knew or should have known that schedules could be 
amended at anytime during the pendency of a bankruptcy matter, 
irrespective of their failure to move for an extension of time, 
this is not even discretionary with the Court to deny. Tignor v. 
Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977 (1984); In Re Doan, 672 F. 2d 831 (1982); 
In Re Greshenbaum, 598 F.2d 779 (1979). 
All of the above assertions by Dr. Harline are denied 
by Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte. 
Bankruptcy Rule 1009 states: 
" (a) General Right to Amend. A voluntary 
petition, list, schedule, statement of 
affairs, . . . may be amended by the debtor 
as a matter of course at any time before the 
case is closed." 
The law is clear that an attorney owes a duty of making 
a reasonable investigation of the facts of a case that he has 
undertaken to represent a client with respect thereto. Hansen v. 
Wightman, 538 P.2d 1238, (Wash. App. 1975). Further, he has a 
duty to his client to use knowledge, skill and ability, ordinarily 
possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession 
similarly situated. 7 Am Jur 2d 249, Attorneys at Law, Sect 199. 
It is submitted that any attorney, under any circumstances, would 
look at a file to ascertain the status of a matter, and what in his 
(19) 
opinion should be done with respect thereto. In a bankruptcy 
matter it is submitted that the looking of the Statement of Affairs 
and the Schedules would be the minimal that any competent attorney 
would look to. It is further, submitted that previous 2004 
proceedings, which are depositions in the bankruptcy arena, should 
be looked to. As previous counsel had been involved, it is 
submitted that a competent attorney would also contact that or 
those attorneys to ascertain what had transpired and their 
thoughts, impressions and ideas. 
What an attorney should do, is a question of fact for the 
determination of the trier of fact. Jackson vs. Dabney, 645 P.2d 
613 (Utah 1982) and while the facts of this case clearly 
demonstrate acts of malpractice on the part of the defendants, it 
is admitted that it is not up to the Court to weigh the 
creditability of the testimony on amotion for summary judgment, it 
must determine if their are disputed issues of material fact. 
Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978); Hill v. Grand Central 
Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970); W. M. Barnes Co. v. 
Sohio National Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981). 
Utah law commands that an attorney represent the 
interests of his client with competence and diligence, and that 
there is an implied covenant to do so. Dunn v. Kckay, Burton, 
McMurray and Thurman, 584 P.2d 894 (Utah 1978). 
(20) 
Utah law, and the cases decided thereunder, are clear 
that Summary Judgment should be granted only when it is clear from 
the undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot prevail. Lack 
v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987); P.A.A.D. v. 
Graystone Pines Homeowners, 789 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990). 
It is not necessary for the plaintiff on a motion for 
summary judgment to prove his legal theories, it is only necessary 
for him, the non-moving party, to show "facts" which controvert 
those facts alleged by the defendants. Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Construction, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988). While it 
is true that the defendants contend that Dr. Harline in signing the 
bankruptcy papers and that this is what caused his harm but it is 
submitted that this is a matter of contributory negligence, and it 
is 
submitted that this issue can only be determined by the trier or 
fact. Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P.2d 1238 (Wash. App. 1975). 
If not contributory negligence, then, perhaps, an independent 
intervening cause to the injuries to the plaintiff, which would 
preclude recovery by the plaintiff. However, the existence of an 
independent intervening cause, is an issue for determination by the 
trier of fact, and not one of law. Collins on behalf of Collins v. 
Perrine, 778 P.2d 912 (N.M. App. 1989). 
Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte attempt to assert that it is 
necessary for Dr. Harline to prove that the attorney-client 
(21) 
relationship was entered into in October or November, 1986. This 
is wrong. When ever the attorney-client relationship occurred, if 
the attorney commits an act of malpractice, he is liable for any 
damages, whether nominal or otherwise, which may have resulted from 
his acts or failures to act. If that relationship occurred 
remains a disputed fact in this case. 
POINT TWO 
DAMAGES, ARE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 
BY THE TRIER OF FACTS 
The amount of damages is an issue for determination by a 
trier of fact, and nominal damages may be awarded in a legal 
malpractice action, Annotation, 45 ALR2d 96, Sect. 5; Dicta in 
Dunn v. Mckay, Burton, McMurray and Thurman, 584 P.2d 894 (Utah 
1978), even if no greater damages are established. Mere 
speculation or conjecture cannot be the basis for a judgment, but 
if there is evidence from which an inference may be reasonably 
drawn, it would be error to remove that determination from the 
trier of fact. Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 479 
P.2d 28 (1972). 
POINT THREE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
REQUIRE A DISCLOSURE OF ALL 
WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS 
Rule 26(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in 
pertinent part states: 
(22) 
"Parties may obtain discovery . . .and the identity 
and location of persons having knowledge of any 
discoverable matter." 
One of the purposes of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
is to eliminate the elements of surprise and trickery, Ellis v. 
Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 (1987). As stated in the case 
of State Road Commission v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 381, 412 P.2d 914 
(1966): 
"The idea of making a lawsuit a game of 
tricks by keeping information secret to 
surprise the opposition at a critical moment 
is more suited to the fictionalized drama of 
stories and plays than to actual trials in a 
court of justice. 
The Court went on and observed: 
"We see no impropriety in requiring the plaintiff 
to state the names and addresses of its witnesses." 
POINT FOUR 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
REQUIRE A PARTY TO REVEAL ALL 
MATTERS THAT COULD LEAD TO 
DISCOVERY OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte objected to the answering of 
interrogatories of Dr. Harline, in part, on the basis that the 
interrogatories were not relevant. 
Those interrogatories ran from when Mr. Barker and Mr. 
Whyte commenced to represent Dr. Harline though their past 
experience in dealing with bankruptcy matters in their practice of 
law. Ellis v. Gilbert, supra. It is submitted that the 
(23) 
interrogatories were in fact relevant and the trial court did not 
make any effort to examine Dr. Harline's motion, as clearly, upon 
reading the interrogatories and the objections thereto, or if it 
did look at the interrogatories and the answers, it erred in 
applying common sense. It is inescapable but what the 
interrogatories were proper and would have lead not only to 
discoverable evidence but also to answers to critical issues 
involved in this malpractice action. It is conceded that the 
actions of the trial court with respect to discovery matters are 
generally up to the trial court, Utah v. Petty, supra, but this is 
not without limit. Also, discovery is to be liberally permitted. 
Utah v. Petty, supra.; Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred 
in granting summary judgment in this matter where there remained 
genuine issues of fact unresolved. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred 
in denying Dr. Harline's motion to overrule objections to 
interrogatories and to deny his motion to compel answers to 
interrogatories. 
The summary judgment should be set aside and the matter 
remanded back to the trial court for trial on the merits. 
(24) 
The Trial Court's denial of Dr. Harline's motion to 
overrule the objections should be overturned and an order 
entered overruling defendant's objections, further, the court 
should enter its order to compel the defendants to answer the 
interrogatories heretofore propounded by the plaintiff. 
(25) 
ADDENDUM 
1. Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Proc 
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY. 
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
(a) Discovery methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of 
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written ques-
tions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permis-
sion to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; 
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the 
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including 
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground 
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial 
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in 
Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the 
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtain-
able from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportu-
nity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or 
(hi) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into ac-
count the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the 
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litiga-
tion. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or 
pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
( 2 6 ) 
2 . R u l e 56 , Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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